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Abstract
This paper examines the eects of mandatory disclosure information
on unobservable precision choices by management of voluntary disclosure.
Prior research articles investigate the precision of information disclosed by
management, but they do not consider the relationships between mandatory
and voluntary disclosure information. In this paper, I focus on the relation-
ships and analyze precision choices under the situation that there are manda-
tory and voluntary disclosure. I find that mandatory disclosure information
influences precision choices of voluntary disclosure.
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1 Introduction
Since accounting standards do not require firms to disclose full information,
they disclose only a part of it. However, I can easily consider that the information
which is not disclosed is useful for investors to make a decision. Thus, volun-
tary disclosure is one of the important fields in accounting, and there are many
researches about voluntary disclosure.1 On the other hand, there are researches
about precision of information disclosed by management. It is dicult for out-
siders to verify the precision of the information, because there is not a distinct
criteria about the precision. If investors cannot verify the precision, it is probable
that they cannot estimate the firm value properly. Therefore, it is important to
study the precision of disclosed information.
Thus, there are some researches about precision of mandatory disclosure in-
formation but there is no research, to my best knowledge, about the precision of
voluntary disclosure by management. I consider that the research is a very im-
portant research area, because there are no regulations of voluntary disclosure by
management. Subramanyam (1996) examines the market reaction to information
when the information precision is uncertain and exogenous. Penno (1996) investi-
gates precision choices by management in financial reporting when the precision
choices are endogenous and unobservable. This shows that the precision choices
depend on prior information in financial reporting. It is natural to assume that the
precision is endogenous and unobservable, because the management understand
the cost of gathering and disclosing information.2 Thus, I focus on the precision
1There are many researches that study firm’s voluntary disclosure. Verrecchia (2001) and Dye
(2001), for example, investigate voluntary disclosure comprehensively.
2Hughes and Pae (2004) assume that the precision of mandatory disclosure is exogenous and
private information of the management. They examine the decision of disclosing the information
by the management.
1
of voluntary disclosure information, assuming the precision is endogenous and
unobservable.
Most literatures about voluntary disclosure focus on the decision of whether or
not disclosing information, but there are few literatures which examine the deci-
sion under the situation that there are both mandatory and voluntary disclosure. I
consider that the reason is that the two disclosure schemes are not interdependent.
While firms are even more required to disclose additional information by account-
ing regulation, firms voluntarily disclose information more and more. Einhorn
(2005) studies the management disclosure decision with and without disclosure
regulation.3 This research shows that the number of firms which disclose infor-
mation voluntarily becomes larger when there is a disclosure regulation. This is
because mandatory disclosure information and voluntary disclosure are not alter-
native but complementary. Therefore, prior researches which do not consider the
relation have the weak implication to accounting standard-setting bodies.
Prior researches which examine the precision of disclosed information do not
take into account the relation between mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclo-
sure. Therefore, I extend the basic precision model examined by Penno (1996) to
take into account the relationships between mandatory disclosure information and
voluntary disclosure information. Assuming that the management chooses the
precision of voluntary disclosure information, I introduce mandatory disclosure
information exogenously to the model.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework of
unobservable precision choices under the situation that there are mandatory and
voluntary disclosure. This paper explains that the precision by the management is
3Bagnoli and Watts (2007) also examines the management disclosure decision under the situ-
ation that there are mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure information. They assume that
the two information are complementary.
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determined by mandatory information required by the regulations and prior infor-
mation about the contents of voluntary disclosure information. When both these
information and mandatory are good news or bad news, I get similar result to the
prior research. That is, the precision choices mainly depend on the prior informa-
tion (good news or bad news). On the other hand, when the two information are
dierent respectively (e.g., one is good news, the other is bad news), the precision
choices are determined by both mandatory information and the prior information.
This shows that the role of mandatory disclosure varies by the quality of the prior
information of voluntary disclosure information.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 presents the result. Section 4 presents the conclusion.
2 The model
This model is an extension of Penno’s (1996) unobservable precision choices
model. While Penno’s(1996) model assumes there is only one public signal, I
assume that there are two public information, where one is media information and
the other is mandatory information. I assume a risk-neutral market. My model
considers management who chooses precision of voluntary disclosure information
to maximize expected end-of-period firm value. After observing the two public
signals, the management chooses precision of voluntary disclosure information,
which is unobservable for investors. These signals are credibly disclosed, and
investors (the market) use all the public information to price the firm at expected
value.
Next, I explain the timeline.I consider five steps in this model. The value of the
firm is V˜ , which is a random variable and normally distributed with mean  and
variance 2V , i.e., V˜  N (;2V ). In the first step , media information is publicly
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observed, denoted by z˜.
In the second step, mandatory disclosure information is publicly observed,
designated by s˜, where s˜ = V˜ + ˜. The variable ˜ is identically independent and
normally distributed, with zero mean and variance 2 , i.e., ˜  N (0;2 ). Here,
 is a variable that represents how much information of the firm value is included
in mandatory disclosure information, i.e.,  2 [0;1]. This means that mandatory
disclosure information is a part of the firm’s value, and white noise.
In the third step, the management privately chooses the precision  of vol-
untary disclosure information, after observing media information and mandatory
disclosure information. The precision variable  2 [L; H], 0 < L < H is a
continuous choice variable by the management, and the cost of precision choices
can be represented as c, where c > 0. Thus, the value of the firm after choosing
precision is V˜   c.
In the fourth step, voluntary disclosure information t˜. The voluntary disclo-
sure information of the firm value is represented as t() = (1   )V + "   c,
where " is identically independent and normally distributed, with mean zero and
precision 1=. That is, voluntary disclosure information consists of a part of the
firm value which is not included in mandatory disclosure information, noise based
on precision by the management, and the precision cost,
In the fifth step, investors (the market) price this firm at it’s expected value
conditional on the prior information. That is, the price of the firm is equal to
conditional expected value of the firm value after choosing precision, P = E[V  
cjz; s; t()].
I adopt Penno (1996) approach. That is, "media information is a garbling of
the least informative information". When choosing 0 and 00 (L  0 < 00 
H) , I assume that there exists a random variable ˜ such that:
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t˜(0) + c0 = t˜(00) + c00 + ˜
where ˜ is an identically independent and normal random variable with mean
zero. This means that t˜(0) + c0 is a garbling of t˜(00) + c0. Thus, we can
represent that z = t(L)+ cL + = (1  )V˜ +"L +  ˜, where  ˜ is an identically
independent and normally distributed white noise term with mean zero i.e., ˜ 
N (0;2 ). So, z˜ is normally distributed with a  mean and variance 
2
z = 
2
V +
2L + 
2
 .
3 Results
3.1 Basic case
The price of the firm P(s; t; z) is represented by equation (1).4 The manage-
ment chooses the precision of voluntary disclosure to maximize the expected value
of the firm value at the third step. The expected value of the firm value is repre-
sented by equation (2) . Therefore, the management maximizes the expected value
of the firm price conditional on media information and mandatory disclosure in-
formation (E[P˜(s; t˜; z) jz; s]).5
P(s; t; z) = E[V   cjz; s; t()]
= E[V˜   c] +
Cov(V˜   c; s˜)   Cov(V˜ c;t˜)Cov(s˜;t˜)Var (t˜)
Var (s˜)   (Cov(s˜;t˜))2Var (t˜)
(s   E(s˜))
+
Cov(V˜   c; t˜)   Cov(V˜ c;s˜)Cov(s˜;t˜)Var (s˜)
Var (t˜)   (Cov(s˜;t˜))2Var (s˜)
(t   E(t˜)) (1)
4See the appendix.
5See the appendix.
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E[P˜(s; t˜; z) jz; s] = E[E[[V˜   cjs; t(); z]jz; s]
= E[V˜   c] +
Cov(V˜   c; s˜)   Cov(V˜ c;t˜)Cov(s˜;t˜)Var (t˜)
Var (s˜)   (Cov(s˜;t˜))2Var (t˜)
(s   E(s˜))
+
Cov(V˜   c; t˜)   Cov(V˜ c;s˜)Cov(s˜;t˜)Var (s˜)
Var (t˜)   (Cov(s˜;t˜))2Var (s˜)
(E(t˜ js; z)   (1   ) + cM (s; z))
(2)
There exists one Nash equilibrium, where the management chooses the preci-
sion to maximize the expected value. Let  be such that the management chooses
to maximize the object function. Furthermore, let FB be such that management
choose to maximize without precision constraints.6 From the assumption, the pre-
cision choices by management are unobservable, so the market conjecture the
precision. The market conjecture is denoted by M . This model provides a unique
equilibrium. The equilibrium depends on the realized value of the media infor-
mation and mandatory disclosure information. Here, I define the realized value of
the information that is higher than the mean of the information as "Good news",
and the realized value of the information that is lower than the mean of the infor-
mation as "Bad news". If both the media information and mandatory disclosure
information are Good news or Bad news, I call them "same direction", otherwise
"dierent direction".
6The precision which mamize the object function without constraints is
FB =
s
Var (s˜)(z   E(z))   Cov(s˜; z˜)(s   E(s))
f(Cov(s˜; z˜)2   Var ( z˜)Var (s˜)gc :
The detail of this is in appendix.
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3.1.1 Dierent direction of the media information and mandatory disclo-
sure information
Here, I show the precision choices by the management in the case of dierent
direction of media information and mandatory disclosure information, In this case,
we obtain the similar results of the prior research. In particular, the precision
choices by the management are same of the prior research., when the value of
media information is Good news (z > E(z)).
PROPOSITION 1
(1) When the value of media information is Bad news (z < E(z)), the equilib-
rium precision strategy by management is
 =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
L , if FB  L < H
FB , if L < FB < H
H , if L < H  FB :
In this case, the object function is shown in figure1.
(2) When the value of media information is Good news (z > E(z)), the equi-
librium precision strategy by management is
 = L :
In this case, the object function is shown in figure2.
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In the case of (1), the management expects that the low realized value of the
media information is realized by a noise term.
On the other hand, in the case of (2), mandatory disclosure information does
not influence the precision choices by management. The management expects that
the low value of the information realized. If the management chose high preci-
sion, it would be likely that the lower value of voluntary disclosure information is
realized. Therefore the management chooses the lowest precision.
3.1.2 Same direction of the media information and mandatory disclosure
information
Here, I show the precision choices by management in the case of same the
directions. I show that the precision choices by management is dependent on the
value of both media information and mandatory disclosure information.
PROPOSITION 2
When the value of media information is lower than the expected value of the
media information conditional on mandatory disclosure (z < E[z js]), the equilib-
rium precision strategy by management is
 =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
L , if FB  L < H
FB , if L < FB < H
H , if L < H  FB :
In this case, the object function is shown in figure1.
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When the value of media information is higher than the expected value of
the media information conditional on mandatory disclosure (z > E[z js]), the
equilibrium precision strategy by management is
 = L :
In this case, the object function is shown in figure2.
Thus, the precision choice by management is aected by the value of manda-
tory disclosure information in these cases. This is because that the management
can not find the cause of the value of media information. That is, the observed
value of media information is realized by whether the firm value or noises. So,
the management would find the cause by using the value of mandatory disclosure
information. When the value of media information is lower than the expected
value of the information conditional on mandatory disclosure, the management
considers that the low value of the information is realized by a noise term.
On the other hand, when the value of media information is higher than the
expected value of the information conditional on mandatory disclosure informa-
tion, the management considers that the high value of the information realized by
noises. Therefore, the management does not choose the high precision.
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ΡP
Figure 1: case(1)
Ρ
P
Figure 2: case(2)
3.2 Particular case
In this section, we examine the precision choices by management, when preci-
sion cost is zero (c = 0). The aim of this section is to show when the management
has an incentive to choose high precision.
PROPOSITION 3
(3) When the realized value of media information is higher than the expected
value of the media information conditional on mandatory disclosure information(E[z js] <
z), the management chooses the lowest precision.
 = L
In this case, the object function is shown in figure3.
(4) When the realized value of media information is lower than the expected
value of the media information conditional on mandatory disclosure information(E[z js] >
z), the management chooses the highest precision (H).
 = H
In this case, the object function is shown in figure4.
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Thus, the precision choices by management depend on whether the value of
the media information is higher or lower than the expected value of the informa-
tion conditional on the value of mandatory disclosure information. When the value
of media information is higher than the expected value of the information condi-
tional on mandatory disclosure information (E[z js] < z), management does not
have a incentive to choose high precision, because the object function decreases in
precision. When the value of media information is lower than the expected value
of the information conditional on mandatory disclosure information (E[z js] > z),
management has a incentive to choose high precision, because the object function
increases in precision.
Ρ
P
Figure 3: case(3)
Ρ
P
Figure 4: case(4)
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4 Conclusion
This paper provides an extension model of the basic precision model. Assum-
ing that the management chooses the precision of voluntary disclosure informa-
tion, I introduce mandatory disclosure information to the model. This paper ex-
amines the influence of mandatory disclosure information on the precision choices
by management. I observe that mandatory disclosure information has influence on
the precision choices. In particular, I focus on the incentives of precision choices
by management. When the two public information (media and mandatory) are in
dierent directions (Good or Bad), I observe the similar results of the prior re-
search. In this case, the incentive of precision choices depends on the direction of
media information. However, I observe dierent results, when the two public in-
formation are in the same direction. That is, the incentive depends not only on the
direction of media information but also on the direction of mandatory disclosure
information.
This research contributes to accounting standard-setting bodies, because it of-
fers a theoretical framework of unobservable precision choices under the situation
that there are both mandatory and voluntary disclosure. It is more natural to as-
sume that the precision is endogenous and unobservable under the situation. Thus,
I consider that my model can be applied to various contexts.
However, there is room for improvement. The property of mandatory disclo-
sure is exogenous, but I can not observe the influence of incentive change on the
market in this model. This is a topic for my future research.
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APPENDIX A
The price of the firm
This appendix provides price function. The price of the firm is equal to con-
ditional expected value of the firm value after choosing precision. Thus, the price
function is
P(s; t; z) = E[V   cjz; s; t()]
= E[V˜   c] +
Cov(V˜   c; s˜)   Cov(V˜ c;t˜)Cov(s˜;t˜)Var (t˜)
Var (s˜)   (Cov(s˜;t˜))2Var (t˜)
(s   E(s˜))
+
Cov(V˜   c; t˜)   Cov(V˜ c;s˜)Cov(s˜;t˜)Var (s˜)
Var (t˜)   (Cov(s˜;t˜))2Var (s˜)
(t   E(t˜)):
The expected value of this price of the firm
The expected value of this price of the firm is equal to conditional expected
value of the firm value before voluntary disclosure information is disclosed. That
is, the expected value of this price of the firm is the expected value of the firm
price conditional on media information and mandatory disclosure information.
E[P˜(s; t˜) jz; s] = E[E[[V˜   cjz; ; t()]jz; s]
= E[V˜   c] +
Cov(V˜   c; s˜)   Cov(V˜ c;t˜)Cov(s˜;t˜)Var (t˜)
Var (s˜)   (Cov(s˜;t˜))2Var (t˜)
(s   E(s˜))
+
Cov(V˜   c; t˜)   Cov(V˜ c;s˜)Cov(s˜;t˜)Var (s˜)
Var (t˜)   (Cov(s˜;t˜))2Var (s˜)
(E(t˜ js; z)   (1   ) + cM (s; z))
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The precision which maximize the object function without constraints
From above results, to maximize the object function is equal to maximizing
the expected value of the voluntary disclosure information conditional on media
information and voluntary disclosure information (E[t˜ js; z]).
E[t˜ js; z]
= E[t˜] +
Cov(t˜; s˜)   Cov(t˜;z˜)Cov(s˜;z˜)Var (t˜)
Var (s˜)   (Cov(s˜;z˜))2Var ( z˜)
(s   E(s˜)) +
Cov(t˜; z˜)   Cov(t˜;s˜)Cov(s˜;z˜)Var (s˜)
Var ( z˜)   (Cov(s˜;z˜))2Var (s˜)
(z   E(z))
= (1   ) + Var (s˜)(z   E(z))   Cov(s˜; z˜)(s   E(s))
Var ( z˜)Var (s˜)   (Cov(s˜; z˜)2
1

  c
+
Var (s˜)(z   E(z))   Cov(s˜; z˜)(s   E(s))
Var ( z˜)Var (s˜)   (Cov(s˜; z˜)2 [(1   )
2 + (1   )]2V
= (1   ) +  1

  c + (1   )]2V ;
where  =
Var (s˜)(z   E(z))   Cov(s˜; z˜)(s   E(s))
Var ( z˜)Var (s˜)   (Cov(s˜; z˜)2
Thus, the expected value of the voluntary disclosure information conditional
on media information and voluntary disclosure information (E[t˜ js; z]) is a function
of the precision by management. When the  > 0, there exists the precision that
maximize the function. So, the precision which maximize the object function
without constraints is
FB =
s
Var (s˜)(z   E(z))   Cov(s˜; z˜)(s   E(s))
f(Cov(s˜; z˜)2   Var ( z˜)Var (s˜)gc :
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Table 1: Main notations
variable
V˜ firm value V˜  N (;2V )
˜ white noise ˜  N (0;2 )
 the weight  2 [0;1]
 precision by management 0 < L    H
"˜ controllable noise "˜  N (0;1=)
z˜ media information (1   )V˜ + "L +  ˜
s˜ mandatory disclosure information V˜ + ˜
t˜ voluntary disclosure information (1   )V˜ + "˜   c
15
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